This is form wiredispatch.
Interesting that recent Taliban statements about talks do not explicitly state that the Karzai government must go. Many opposition parties seem to be quite favorable to negotiations. Karzai too has even offered positions in the government but as long as Karzai insists on keeping foreign troops in Afghanistan there is no chance of an agreement. If at some point Karzai should decide that he can survive without his western backers then he could actually ask troops to leave. That is unlikely to happen in the near future though. It seems the only way that Canadian troops could return home! However if more opposition parties decide that the Taliban jihad against the occupiers is justified NATO could be in for more troubles.
Taliban vow to fight on, offer talks with Afghans
Mon May 26, 2008 8:46am EDT
By Sayed Salahuddin
KABUL (Reuters) - The Taliban will fight on till the last foreign soldier is driven out of Afghanistan, but their door is always open to talks with other Afghan opposition groups, the Islamist movement said on Monday.
The offer comes days after Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former president and mujahideen chief, now opposition leader, said the Taliban had shown a desire for political dialogue and called for serious efforts to establish talks with the Islamist rebels.
The Taliban "will fight till the withdrawal of the last crusading-invader, but the door for talks, understanding and negotiations will always be open for the all the mujahideen," the Taliban said in a statement on its website.
But, the Taliban said, the mujahideen should join the insurgency and help fight to drive out foreign forces.
Rabbani and other former leaders of the mujahideen forces which fought the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, then each other in the 1990s, now dominate the opposition in parliament.
The Taliban have previously said they would also fight on to depose President Hamid Karzai, but there was no mention of the Western-backed Afghan government in Monday's statement.
The Taliban cited "sacrilege" against Islam since U.S. President George W. Bush spoke of a crusade against terrorism in 2001, up until the recent shooting of a Koran by a U.S. soldier in Iraq. All proof of the "crusaders' hostility towards Islam".
TALIBAN CONTACTS
"Now, the Muslims of the world and Afghanistan, and in particular, the leaders of the groups who consider themselves Muslims and mujahideen are under the service of the invaders and crusaders," the Taliban statement said.
The mujahideen, the Taliban said, "may have realized the time has come to begin an armed jihad against the crusading-invaders. This is the only way for rescuing the Islamic nation and dear Afghanistan."
Rabbani, who now leads the opposition block in parliament, said he had established contact with the Taliban several months ago and had received a letter in recent days containing "some encouraging messages" from the Taliban addressed to the alliance of parties he leads.
The Taliban statement did not directly refer to Rabbani's comments.
U.S.-led troops, helped by Afghan mujahideen groups, toppled the Taliban in 2001 after the hardline Islamist movement refused to hand over al Qaeda leaders behind the September 11 attacks on the United States.
But many of the factions that helped topple the Taliban now feel sidelined and some have privately shown dissatisfaction with the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan.
More than 12,000 people have been killed by violence in Afghanistan in the past two years, the bloodiest period since the overthrow of the Taliban government.
More than 62,000 foreign troops led by NATO and the U.S. military are stationed in Afghanistan. Foreign commanders say the troops will leave the country when Afghan security forces are able to stand on their feet.
(Editing by Valerie Lee)
© Thomson Reuters 2008. All rights reserved.
Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Monday, May 26, 2008
Thursday, April 17, 2008
What we are fighting for in Afghanistan!
Rick Hillier with his foul mouth claims that our mission in Afghanistan is:
Canadian Forces were going to fight "detestable murderers and scumbags," he said. Their focus wasn't reconstruction or aid. "We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people," he said (Victoria Colonist.)
However, it seems that we are in the business of killing the Taliban scumbags and murderers so as to support an Afghan government that re-introduced the Dept. of Virtue and Vice and now is pushing strict Islamic laws of a Taliban type, a government that condemns people to death for converting from Islam to Christianity etc.etc. From Yahoo News.
Afghan parliament committee drafts Taliban-style moral law Wed Apr 16, 1:25 PM ET
An Afghan legislative committee has drafted a bill seeking to introduce Taliban-style Islamic morality codes banning women from wearing make-up in public and forbidding young boys from wearing female fashions.
The draft, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, needs approval by both chambers of the Islamist-dominated parliament and President Hamid Karzai signature to become a law.
"Women and girls are obliged to not wear make-up, wear suitable dresses and observe hijab (veil) while at work or classrooms," said one article of the draft.
It also aims to ban women dancers performing during concerts and other public events as well as on television.
"The mass media including television and cable networks must avoid broadcasting programmes against Islamic morals," it said without giving details.
In a similar move the parliament, which is dominated by former anti-Soviet Islamist warlords, called earlier this month for a ban on dancing and Indian soap dramas on private television networks.
Men and young boys must avoid wearing bracelets, necklaces, "feminist dresses," and hair-bands, the draft reads.
The proposals also demand an end to dog and bird-fighting, pigeon-flying, billiards and video games, all past times favoured by many Afghans.
It demands separate halls for men and women during wedding parties, while loud music is banned at such gatherings. Afghans hold big and costly get-togethers for weddings, usually in a public hall with music.
If the proposals are passed, violators could be fined 500 Afghanis (10 dollars) to 5,000, according to the draft.
The plans mirror many of the laws introduced by the extremist Taliban regime, which ruled the country from 1996 to 2001 with strict Islamic Sharia law.
Canadian Forces were going to fight "detestable murderers and scumbags," he said. Their focus wasn't reconstruction or aid. "We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people," he said (Victoria Colonist.)
However, it seems that we are in the business of killing the Taliban scumbags and murderers so as to support an Afghan government that re-introduced the Dept. of Virtue and Vice and now is pushing strict Islamic laws of a Taliban type, a government that condemns people to death for converting from Islam to Christianity etc.etc. From Yahoo News.
Afghan parliament committee drafts Taliban-style moral law Wed Apr 16, 1:25 PM ET
An Afghan legislative committee has drafted a bill seeking to introduce Taliban-style Islamic morality codes banning women from wearing make-up in public and forbidding young boys from wearing female fashions.
The draft, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, needs approval by both chambers of the Islamist-dominated parliament and President Hamid Karzai signature to become a law.
"Women and girls are obliged to not wear make-up, wear suitable dresses and observe hijab (veil) while at work or classrooms," said one article of the draft.
It also aims to ban women dancers performing during concerts and other public events as well as on television.
"The mass media including television and cable networks must avoid broadcasting programmes against Islamic morals," it said without giving details.
In a similar move the parliament, which is dominated by former anti-Soviet Islamist warlords, called earlier this month for a ban on dancing and Indian soap dramas on private television networks.
Men and young boys must avoid wearing bracelets, necklaces, "feminist dresses," and hair-bands, the draft reads.
The proposals also demand an end to dog and bird-fighting, pigeon-flying, billiards and video games, all past times favoured by many Afghans.
It demands separate halls for men and women during wedding parties, while loud music is banned at such gatherings. Afghans hold big and costly get-togethers for weddings, usually in a public hall with music.
If the proposals are passed, violators could be fined 500 Afghanis (10 dollars) to 5,000, according to the draft.
The plans mirror many of the laws introduced by the extremist Taliban regime, which ruled the country from 1996 to 2001 with strict Islamic Sharia law.
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
The Ugly Truth in Afghanistan
From the Globe and Mail. This is the situation that the Liberals and Conservatives are keeping our troops in until at least 2011. This they call "supporting the troops" ensuring that more are killed and maimed and that the Canadian taxpayer supports the U.S. mission by supplying them more equipment as well.
The ugly truth in Afghanistan
GRAEME SMITH AND PAUL KORING
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
March 1, 2008 at 12:28 AM EST
KABUL AND WASHINGTON — When managers from all the major humanitarian agencies in Kandahar gathered in a high-walled compound to swap war stories last month, it wasn't the tales of kidnappings and suicide bombs that caused the most worry. Nor was it the reports of insurgents enforcing their own brutal laws and executing aid workers.
"The scary thing was, no foreigners attended the meeting," a participant said. "Everybody had evacuated."
Most aid organizations quietly withdrew their international staff from Kandahar in recent weeks, the latest sign that the situation here is getting worse. It's now almost impossible to spot a foreigner on the city streets, except for the occasional glimpse of a pale face in a troop carrier or a United Nations armoured vehicle.
At least the foreigners can escape. For many ordinary people the ramshackle city now feels like a prison, with the highways out of town regularly blocked by Taliban or bandits. Residents have even started avoiding their own city streets after dark, as formerly bustling shops switch off their colourful neon lights and pull down the shutters. There is rarely any electricity for the lights anyway, partly because the roads are too dangerous for contractors to risk bringing in a new turbine for a nearby hydroelectric generator.
Corrupt police prowl the intersections, enforcing a curfew for anybody without that night's password, or bribe money. The officers seem especially nervous these days, because the Taliban hit them almost every night with ambushes, rocket-propelled grenades or just a deceptively friendly man who walks up to a police checkpoint with an automatic rifle hidden under a shawl.
Insurgent attacks have climbed sharply in Kandahar and across the country. But some analysts believe the numbers don't capture the full horror of what's happening in Afghanistan's south and east. When a girl in a school uniform is stopped in downtown Kandahar by a man who asks frightening questions about why she's attending classes, that small act of intimidation does not appear in any statistics.
Even so, the statistics are bad. The United Nations's count of security incidents in Afghanistan last year climbed to 13 times the number recorded in 2003, and the UN forecasts even worse this year. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization says insurgent attacks increased 64 per cent from 2006 to 2007. In the first two months of this year, some analysts have noticed a 15- to 20-per-cent rise in insurgent activity compared with the same period last year, raising alarm about whether the traditional spring fighting season has started early.
The prospect of another year of rising bloodshed has forced a moment of reckoning. Almost everybody involved with Afghanistan is taking a hard look at the country's future, even as Canada's Parliament takes stock of its role in the war. The Liberals nearly forced an election this spring over a government motion to extend the mission to 2011 — and although the extension now seems likely to pass when it comes to a vote next month, the mission is increasingly a source of raucous debate in Canada and among its NATO allies.
"Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan," concluded the Atlantic Council of the United States, a prestigious American think tank that deals with international affairs. "Unless this reality is understood and action is taken promptly, the future of Afghanistan is bleak, with regional and global impact."
The toughest parts of the south, such as Kandahar, were considered lawless but not extremely dangerous after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Foreign aid workers drove in unarmoured vehicles along the dirt roads of every district in the province, often with no armed guards. No districts of the province — in fact, no districts in the country — were labelled "extreme risk" on the UN's threat assessment maps in May of 2005.
Despite the relative calm of those years, many aid groups were calling for international forces to bring order in the wild countryside and extend the influence of President Hamid Karzai, who was jokingly called the "Mayor of Kabul" because of his government's limited reach.
Kabul was roaring with activity as foreign aid poured into the capital, and the international community wanted to spread the prosperity into rural areas. It was widely believed that a few thousand troops could stabilize a province such as Kandahar.
"In retrospect, it was naive," said a Western security official in Kabul. "It was a mistake."
By the time Canada's battle group arrived at the beginning of 2006, warning signs were already emerging that the project would not go as planned. The killing of a Canadian diplomat in January of that year prompted Ottawa to cut its provincial reconstruction team from 250 to 120 people early in the year, including a temporary evacuation of all civilian staff, and the Canadians found themselves locked in major clashes with the largest groups of Taliban ever seen in the country since their regime had collapsed.
An updated version of the United Nations threat map was published in June of 2006, showing rising danger levels for humanitarian workers in many parts of Afghanistan, including two of Kandahar's 17 districts, which were coloured solidly pink, indicating "extreme risk."
Like a cancer, those pink splotches on the UN maps have spread until they now dominate the country's south and east. The latest map, updated in December, shows 14 of 17 districts in Kandahar are entirely designated as extreme risk.
Military commanders often sneer at the United Nations threat maps, saying that civilian analysts exaggerate the risks, but security officials say the UN mapping generally reflects the military's own classified analysis, and it's far from the only measure by which Afghanistan's security has worsened in the past two years.
In a blunt assessment this week, Vice-Admiral Michael McConnell, the U.S. intelligence czar, admitted that the Karzai government controls less than one-third of the country. The Taliban hold 10 per cent on a more-or-less permanent basis while the rest is run by local warlords, he said, describing the situation as deteriorating.
Even that gloomy picture may represent an airbrushed version of events, some analysts say, because increasing collusion between Taliban and local powerbrokers — criminal groups, warlords, drug barons, ordinary farmers and even government authorities — allows the insurgents to operate freely in districts without exerting visible control.
A rising campaign of intimidation in recent months also seems aimed at persuading those still undecided about the Taliban. Police officers' bodies, shot or beheaded, have been dumped in public places. Other corpses hang from trees, dangling from nooses with the word "spy" scrawled on a note attached to the body. More detailed notes are posted at night on the front doors of anybody suspected of having sympathies for the Kabul government, warning of deadly consequences for anybody who helps what the Taliban call a "puppet regime." It's well known that the insurgents rarely make empty threats.
Even if villagers aren't afraid of the Taliban, many join up because they find the new government unpalatable. No regime has ever been overthrown at the ballot box in Afghanistan, so political opposition often becomes part of the insurgency.
Many Afghans view the government as a family business, reaping the spoils from foreign donors at the expense of those who don't belong to the well-connected tribes or family networks.
They watch government officials profit from the drug trade, and grow angry when eradicators destroy their small field of poppies. And in the battle-scarred landscape where Canadians operate, many people nurse deep grudges against the foreign troops after having their relatives detained or killed in the years of fighting.
"That's where we're seeing the growth in this insurgency, from the local grievances," Joanna Nathan, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said.
The increases in bloodshed have been dramatic: Last year, more than 6,500 people, most of them ordinary Afghans, were killed in the violence, as compared with roughly 4,000 in 2006, and 1,000 in 2005. More than 220 foreign soldiers, most of them Americans but also dozens of Canadian and British troops, were also killed in 2007, by far the deadliest year since the United States invaded. Those early years of fighting, in 2001 and 2002, caused 80 deaths among the U.S. troops and their foreign allies.
ď Canada's 2,500 troops are deployed in a rugged province of blistering deserts, snowy mountains and lush valleys roughly the size of Nova Scotia. With a desperately poor population of more than one million people and a long, porous border with the hotbed of Islamic extremism in neighbouring Pakistan's tribal lands, bringing security to Kandahar would be a challenge even without the Taliban.
On most days, fewer than 600 Canadian soldiers are "outside the wire" of NATO's sprawling base at Kandahar Airport, a number that everyone concedes is far too few to conduct a classic counterinsurgency campaign.
For rough comparison, NATO sent 40,000 troops into Kosovo — a place roughly one-quarter the size of Kandahar and with no active insurgency in 1999. More than one-third of them are still there eight years later. In fact, NATO has five times as many troops deployed in Kosovo as Canada has in Kandahar.
Comparisons with other insurgencies show a similar shortfall of soldiers in the Afghan war: Conflicts in Somalia, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Iraq all required far more troops per capita than NATO has devoted to Afghanistan.
But finding another country to replace Canada, or even provide the additional 1,000 soldiers the Harper government is demanding as a price for staying in Kandahar until 2011, won't be easy. Few NATO members are in a position to help.
A simpler, more effective, solution exists: The number of boots on the ground, outside the wire, could be doubled if deployments were increased to a year from the current six months.
It's unpopular with those in uniform and politically difficult, but even the huge U.S. military has turned to longer deployments as an effective force multiplier.
U.S. army units now deploy for 15 months. Canadian troops spend barely one-third that length of time in Afghanistan, once a mid-deployment vacation is included. The relatively short deployments also means that the two- or three-week overlap required to get the incoming unit familiar with the people and terrain they will occupy and fight cuts more deeply into their effective time on the ground than if rotations were longer.
Longer rotations would also reduce the problems that happen every time a fresh group of Canadians arrives in Kandahar. There is usually a spike in civilian shootings as the nervous new troops settle into their roles, and Afghan politicians complain that every new group of soldiers seems to forget what the previous rotation learned. Every newly arrived soldier is forced to start anew with the slow process of building the personal relationships that form the critical basis of all dealings in a traditional, largely illiterate society.
While the Canadian army is probably too small to send two 1,000-soldier battle groups to Afghanistan simultaneously on six-month deployments, doubling deployment lengths to a year and adding another 400 or 500 soldiers would come close to doubling the available boots on the ground.
The other serious shortfalls that plague the war in Kandahar may be harder to solve. The desperate shortage of medium- and heavy-lift helicopters is so serious, and European allies so unwilling to help, that NATO is chartering Russian commercial helicopters to move food, fuel and munitions. While that reduces the exposure of resupply convoys to the deadly roadside bombs, the civilian-flown choppers aren't cleared to carry troops.
At least temporarily, hard-pressed Canadian troops in Kandahar will get help when more than 2,000 battle-hardened U.S. Marines and their helicopters land this spring in southern Afghanistan.
"My hope is that the addition of the Marines will provide the kind of help that will reduce the levels of casualties," U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said when asked about the disproportionate number of Canadians killed battling the Taliban.
The Marines, sent in to reinforce NATO forces for this summer's fighting season, will add massive punching strength to the thinly stretched Canadians in Kandahar. The influx of Americans may also bring a shift in strategy: U.S. commanders have been saying that Canada and other NATO countries have been too "soft," too hesitant to pursue the Taliban into their rural strongholds.
The Canadians, by contrast, have often quietly denigrated the American forces from whom they inherited Kandahar in 2006, saying the U.S. soldiers were more interested in "search-and-destroy" operations than holding key zones and trying to bring development in limited areas.
Canadian and Dutch forces in the south have pointedly avoided major sweeps through far-flung Taliban enclaves in the past year, and even avoided patrolling some Taliban-held villages just 15 kilometres outside of Kandahar city, saying they don't have the necessary troops.
That cautious approach will likely end with the arrival of the Marines.
The American presence may continue to grow, too. Shifting political priorities in the United States are bringing new attention to Afghanistan.
Iraq "distracted us from the fight that needed to be fought in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda," said Senator Barack Obama, the Democratic front-runner, who has promised to both pull all of his country's 160,000 soldiers out of Iraq and send tens of thousands to Afghanistan.
Recent developments in another country, Pakistan, may also affect Afghanistan. The defeat of religious parties in a recent election; a recent spate of insurgent attacks on Pakistani military and intelligence targets; and the rise of the so-called Pakistani Taliban whose declared goal is waging holy war against Islamabad, have raised hopes among an optimistic few observers that Pakistan's authorities might finally take action against the Taliban's havens in that country. Others see the turmoil in Pakistan as a grim sign.
Nearly everyone agrees, however, that Afghanistan will likely see rising violence in 2008. Two Western security analysts predicted that the year will bring increased sophistication in the Taliban's technology; they're likely to use so-called explosively formed penetrators„© for the first time, adopting a technique often used in Iraq to puncture even the most heavily armoured vehicle with a specially shaped explosive.
Afghanistan's economic growth is also expected to continue slowing. Private investment was cut in half in 2007 compared with a year earlier, to about $500-million, and trade within the country will be hampered by Taliban and criminal roadblocks on the main highways.
The insurgency is showing signs of increased radicalization, too, and analysts expect this will continue with spectacularly vicious attacks in the coming year, as the most extreme insurgent leaders try to wrestle control away from more moderate Taliban who may consider the government's offer of negotiations.
It's unclear whether a political settlement can be reached with the Taliban, or what that might resemble if it happens, but the difficult process of talking with the insurgents won't likely bear fruit in the coming year. Even the most optimistic NATO officials say they cannot expect to reduce the levels of violence in 2008, and the Taliban claim they have momentum, meaning they're unlikely to give Kabul favourable terms.
"Existing measures to promote peace in Afghanistan are not succeeding," said a report published this week by Oxfam International.
But if the tough situation in Afghanistan does not inspire hope in the short term, many observers still believe success is possible, eventually. The insurgency does not yet appear to be spreading beyond the ethnic Pashtun areas of Afghanistan's south and east. Ms. Nathan of the International Crisis Group said the international community can prevail by digging in for the long term and making the Afghan government into something palatable for ordinary people.
The author of the latest Oxfam report, Matt Waldman, said the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan has inspired other creative ideas about what should happen next.
"We need to think hard about the entire international approach to Afghanistan," Mr. Waldman said.
In an interview at his Kabul office, the respected analyst said he has grown enthusiastic about an approach called "community peace-building," which envisions local meetings to solve the squabbles over land, water or patronage that often simmer underneath the broader reasons for conflict. The solutions may not resemble the kind of Afghanistan that outsiders want, he said, but in some places they may bring peace.
"The secret to success will be not imposing Western ideas and values," he said.
The ugly truth in Afghanistan
GRAEME SMITH AND PAUL KORING
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
March 1, 2008 at 12:28 AM EST
KABUL AND WASHINGTON — When managers from all the major humanitarian agencies in Kandahar gathered in a high-walled compound to swap war stories last month, it wasn't the tales of kidnappings and suicide bombs that caused the most worry. Nor was it the reports of insurgents enforcing their own brutal laws and executing aid workers.
"The scary thing was, no foreigners attended the meeting," a participant said. "Everybody had evacuated."
Most aid organizations quietly withdrew their international staff from Kandahar in recent weeks, the latest sign that the situation here is getting worse. It's now almost impossible to spot a foreigner on the city streets, except for the occasional glimpse of a pale face in a troop carrier or a United Nations armoured vehicle.
At least the foreigners can escape. For many ordinary people the ramshackle city now feels like a prison, with the highways out of town regularly blocked by Taliban or bandits. Residents have even started avoiding their own city streets after dark, as formerly bustling shops switch off their colourful neon lights and pull down the shutters. There is rarely any electricity for the lights anyway, partly because the roads are too dangerous for contractors to risk bringing in a new turbine for a nearby hydroelectric generator.
Corrupt police prowl the intersections, enforcing a curfew for anybody without that night's password, or bribe money. The officers seem especially nervous these days, because the Taliban hit them almost every night with ambushes, rocket-propelled grenades or just a deceptively friendly man who walks up to a police checkpoint with an automatic rifle hidden under a shawl.
Insurgent attacks have climbed sharply in Kandahar and across the country. But some analysts believe the numbers don't capture the full horror of what's happening in Afghanistan's south and east. When a girl in a school uniform is stopped in downtown Kandahar by a man who asks frightening questions about why she's attending classes, that small act of intimidation does not appear in any statistics.
Even so, the statistics are bad. The United Nations's count of security incidents in Afghanistan last year climbed to 13 times the number recorded in 2003, and the UN forecasts even worse this year. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization says insurgent attacks increased 64 per cent from 2006 to 2007. In the first two months of this year, some analysts have noticed a 15- to 20-per-cent rise in insurgent activity compared with the same period last year, raising alarm about whether the traditional spring fighting season has started early.
The prospect of another year of rising bloodshed has forced a moment of reckoning. Almost everybody involved with Afghanistan is taking a hard look at the country's future, even as Canada's Parliament takes stock of its role in the war. The Liberals nearly forced an election this spring over a government motion to extend the mission to 2011 — and although the extension now seems likely to pass when it comes to a vote next month, the mission is increasingly a source of raucous debate in Canada and among its NATO allies.
"Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan," concluded the Atlantic Council of the United States, a prestigious American think tank that deals with international affairs. "Unless this reality is understood and action is taken promptly, the future of Afghanistan is bleak, with regional and global impact."
The toughest parts of the south, such as Kandahar, were considered lawless but not extremely dangerous after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Foreign aid workers drove in unarmoured vehicles along the dirt roads of every district in the province, often with no armed guards. No districts of the province — in fact, no districts in the country — were labelled "extreme risk" on the UN's threat assessment maps in May of 2005.
Despite the relative calm of those years, many aid groups were calling for international forces to bring order in the wild countryside and extend the influence of President Hamid Karzai, who was jokingly called the "Mayor of Kabul" because of his government's limited reach.
Kabul was roaring with activity as foreign aid poured into the capital, and the international community wanted to spread the prosperity into rural areas. It was widely believed that a few thousand troops could stabilize a province such as Kandahar.
"In retrospect, it was naive," said a Western security official in Kabul. "It was a mistake."
By the time Canada's battle group arrived at the beginning of 2006, warning signs were already emerging that the project would not go as planned. The killing of a Canadian diplomat in January of that year prompted Ottawa to cut its provincial reconstruction team from 250 to 120 people early in the year, including a temporary evacuation of all civilian staff, and the Canadians found themselves locked in major clashes with the largest groups of Taliban ever seen in the country since their regime had collapsed.
An updated version of the United Nations threat map was published in June of 2006, showing rising danger levels for humanitarian workers in many parts of Afghanistan, including two of Kandahar's 17 districts, which were coloured solidly pink, indicating "extreme risk."
Like a cancer, those pink splotches on the UN maps have spread until they now dominate the country's south and east. The latest map, updated in December, shows 14 of 17 districts in Kandahar are entirely designated as extreme risk.
Military commanders often sneer at the United Nations threat maps, saying that civilian analysts exaggerate the risks, but security officials say the UN mapping generally reflects the military's own classified analysis, and it's far from the only measure by which Afghanistan's security has worsened in the past two years.
In a blunt assessment this week, Vice-Admiral Michael McConnell, the U.S. intelligence czar, admitted that the Karzai government controls less than one-third of the country. The Taliban hold 10 per cent on a more-or-less permanent basis while the rest is run by local warlords, he said, describing the situation as deteriorating.
Even that gloomy picture may represent an airbrushed version of events, some analysts say, because increasing collusion between Taliban and local powerbrokers — criminal groups, warlords, drug barons, ordinary farmers and even government authorities — allows the insurgents to operate freely in districts without exerting visible control.
A rising campaign of intimidation in recent months also seems aimed at persuading those still undecided about the Taliban. Police officers' bodies, shot or beheaded, have been dumped in public places. Other corpses hang from trees, dangling from nooses with the word "spy" scrawled on a note attached to the body. More detailed notes are posted at night on the front doors of anybody suspected of having sympathies for the Kabul government, warning of deadly consequences for anybody who helps what the Taliban call a "puppet regime." It's well known that the insurgents rarely make empty threats.
Even if villagers aren't afraid of the Taliban, many join up because they find the new government unpalatable. No regime has ever been overthrown at the ballot box in Afghanistan, so political opposition often becomes part of the insurgency.
Many Afghans view the government as a family business, reaping the spoils from foreign donors at the expense of those who don't belong to the well-connected tribes or family networks.
They watch government officials profit from the drug trade, and grow angry when eradicators destroy their small field of poppies. And in the battle-scarred landscape where Canadians operate, many people nurse deep grudges against the foreign troops after having their relatives detained or killed in the years of fighting.
"That's where we're seeing the growth in this insurgency, from the local grievances," Joanna Nathan, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said.
The increases in bloodshed have been dramatic: Last year, more than 6,500 people, most of them ordinary Afghans, were killed in the violence, as compared with roughly 4,000 in 2006, and 1,000 in 2005. More than 220 foreign soldiers, most of them Americans but also dozens of Canadian and British troops, were also killed in 2007, by far the deadliest year since the United States invaded. Those early years of fighting, in 2001 and 2002, caused 80 deaths among the U.S. troops and their foreign allies.
ď Canada's 2,500 troops are deployed in a rugged province of blistering deserts, snowy mountains and lush valleys roughly the size of Nova Scotia. With a desperately poor population of more than one million people and a long, porous border with the hotbed of Islamic extremism in neighbouring Pakistan's tribal lands, bringing security to Kandahar would be a challenge even without the Taliban.
On most days, fewer than 600 Canadian soldiers are "outside the wire" of NATO's sprawling base at Kandahar Airport, a number that everyone concedes is far too few to conduct a classic counterinsurgency campaign.
For rough comparison, NATO sent 40,000 troops into Kosovo — a place roughly one-quarter the size of Kandahar and with no active insurgency in 1999. More than one-third of them are still there eight years later. In fact, NATO has five times as many troops deployed in Kosovo as Canada has in Kandahar.
Comparisons with other insurgencies show a similar shortfall of soldiers in the Afghan war: Conflicts in Somalia, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Iraq all required far more troops per capita than NATO has devoted to Afghanistan.
But finding another country to replace Canada, or even provide the additional 1,000 soldiers the Harper government is demanding as a price for staying in Kandahar until 2011, won't be easy. Few NATO members are in a position to help.
A simpler, more effective, solution exists: The number of boots on the ground, outside the wire, could be doubled if deployments were increased to a year from the current six months.
It's unpopular with those in uniform and politically difficult, but even the huge U.S. military has turned to longer deployments as an effective force multiplier.
U.S. army units now deploy for 15 months. Canadian troops spend barely one-third that length of time in Afghanistan, once a mid-deployment vacation is included. The relatively short deployments also means that the two- or three-week overlap required to get the incoming unit familiar with the people and terrain they will occupy and fight cuts more deeply into their effective time on the ground than if rotations were longer.
Longer rotations would also reduce the problems that happen every time a fresh group of Canadians arrives in Kandahar. There is usually a spike in civilian shootings as the nervous new troops settle into their roles, and Afghan politicians complain that every new group of soldiers seems to forget what the previous rotation learned. Every newly arrived soldier is forced to start anew with the slow process of building the personal relationships that form the critical basis of all dealings in a traditional, largely illiterate society.
While the Canadian army is probably too small to send two 1,000-soldier battle groups to Afghanistan simultaneously on six-month deployments, doubling deployment lengths to a year and adding another 400 or 500 soldiers would come close to doubling the available boots on the ground.
The other serious shortfalls that plague the war in Kandahar may be harder to solve. The desperate shortage of medium- and heavy-lift helicopters is so serious, and European allies so unwilling to help, that NATO is chartering Russian commercial helicopters to move food, fuel and munitions. While that reduces the exposure of resupply convoys to the deadly roadside bombs, the civilian-flown choppers aren't cleared to carry troops.
At least temporarily, hard-pressed Canadian troops in Kandahar will get help when more than 2,000 battle-hardened U.S. Marines and their helicopters land this spring in southern Afghanistan.
"My hope is that the addition of the Marines will provide the kind of help that will reduce the levels of casualties," U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said when asked about the disproportionate number of Canadians killed battling the Taliban.
The Marines, sent in to reinforce NATO forces for this summer's fighting season, will add massive punching strength to the thinly stretched Canadians in Kandahar. The influx of Americans may also bring a shift in strategy: U.S. commanders have been saying that Canada and other NATO countries have been too "soft," too hesitant to pursue the Taliban into their rural strongholds.
The Canadians, by contrast, have often quietly denigrated the American forces from whom they inherited Kandahar in 2006, saying the U.S. soldiers were more interested in "search-and-destroy" operations than holding key zones and trying to bring development in limited areas.
Canadian and Dutch forces in the south have pointedly avoided major sweeps through far-flung Taliban enclaves in the past year, and even avoided patrolling some Taliban-held villages just 15 kilometres outside of Kandahar city, saying they don't have the necessary troops.
That cautious approach will likely end with the arrival of the Marines.
The American presence may continue to grow, too. Shifting political priorities in the United States are bringing new attention to Afghanistan.
Iraq "distracted us from the fight that needed to be fought in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda," said Senator Barack Obama, the Democratic front-runner, who has promised to both pull all of his country's 160,000 soldiers out of Iraq and send tens of thousands to Afghanistan.
Recent developments in another country, Pakistan, may also affect Afghanistan. The defeat of religious parties in a recent election; a recent spate of insurgent attacks on Pakistani military and intelligence targets; and the rise of the so-called Pakistani Taliban whose declared goal is waging holy war against Islamabad, have raised hopes among an optimistic few observers that Pakistan's authorities might finally take action against the Taliban's havens in that country. Others see the turmoil in Pakistan as a grim sign.
Nearly everyone agrees, however, that Afghanistan will likely see rising violence in 2008. Two Western security analysts predicted that the year will bring increased sophistication in the Taliban's technology; they're likely to use so-called explosively formed penetrators„© for the first time, adopting a technique often used in Iraq to puncture even the most heavily armoured vehicle with a specially shaped explosive.
Afghanistan's economic growth is also expected to continue slowing. Private investment was cut in half in 2007 compared with a year earlier, to about $500-million, and trade within the country will be hampered by Taliban and criminal roadblocks on the main highways.
The insurgency is showing signs of increased radicalization, too, and analysts expect this will continue with spectacularly vicious attacks in the coming year, as the most extreme insurgent leaders try to wrestle control away from more moderate Taliban who may consider the government's offer of negotiations.
It's unclear whether a political settlement can be reached with the Taliban, or what that might resemble if it happens, but the difficult process of talking with the insurgents won't likely bear fruit in the coming year. Even the most optimistic NATO officials say they cannot expect to reduce the levels of violence in 2008, and the Taliban claim they have momentum, meaning they're unlikely to give Kabul favourable terms.
"Existing measures to promote peace in Afghanistan are not succeeding," said a report published this week by Oxfam International.
But if the tough situation in Afghanistan does not inspire hope in the short term, many observers still believe success is possible, eventually. The insurgency does not yet appear to be spreading beyond the ethnic Pashtun areas of Afghanistan's south and east. Ms. Nathan of the International Crisis Group said the international community can prevail by digging in for the long term and making the Afghan government into something palatable for ordinary people.
The author of the latest Oxfam report, Matt Waldman, said the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan has inspired other creative ideas about what should happen next.
"We need to think hard about the entire international approach to Afghanistan," Mr. Waldman said.
In an interview at his Kabul office, the respected analyst said he has grown enthusiastic about an approach called "community peace-building," which envisions local meetings to solve the squabbles over land, water or patronage that often simmer underneath the broader reasons for conflict. The solutions may not resemble the kind of Afghanistan that outsiders want, he said, but in some places they may bring peace.
"The secret to success will be not imposing Western ideas and values," he said.
Saturday, February 2, 2008
Report: NATO not winning in Afghanistan
This is from the Washington Post.. NATO and the US with its Operation Enduring Freedom should never have invaded and occupied Afghanistan in the first place. They gave victory to a group of vicious warlords in the Northern Alliance and then guided the Afghans to a new minted in the West Karzai govt. This fine government condemns people to death for distributing women's rights materials or for converting from Islam to Christianity. It has a ministry of Virtue and Vice just as did the Taliban government. It also manages to produce most of the world's opium. This is what Canadians, Americans, and other allies are dying for not to mention the innumerable Afghan casualties which are rarely mentioned. On civilian deaths in Afghanistan see the article in Wikipedia, or Cursor.
NATO's Not Winning in Afghanistan, Report Says
By Ann Scott TysonWashington Post Staff Writer Thursday, January 31, 2008; Page A18
NATO forces in Afghanistan are in a "strategic stalemate," as Taliban insurgents expand their control of sparsely populated areas and as the central government fails to carry out vital reforms and reconstruction, according to an independent assessment released yesterday by NATO's former commander.
"Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan," said the report by the Atlantic Council of the United States, chaired by retired Gen. James L. Jones, who until the summer of 2006 served as the supreme allied commander of NATO.
"Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become a failed state," warned the report, which called for "urgent action" to overhaul NATO strategy in coming weeks before an anticipated new offensive by Taliban insurgents in the spring.
The Atlantic Council report was one of two strongly worded assessments of the war in Afghanistan -- both led by Jones -- released at a Capitol Hill news conference yesterday. The second was by the Afghanistan Study Group, co-chaired by Jones and Thomas R. Pickering, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and other nations.
Jones said several steps are needed to "regain the momentum that appears to have been lost" in Afghanistan: a comprehensive campaign plan that integrates security and reconstruction work; the appointment of a United Nations High Commissioner to coordinate international efforts; and a new regional approach to stabilizing Afghanistan that would include conferences with neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran.
Progress in Afghanistan "is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country," said the report by the Afghanistan Study Group, created by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, which was also involved with the Iraq Study Group.
"The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid," the report said. It highlighted the lack of a clear strategy needed to "fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans."
The study group said the United States should "decouple" Iraq and Afghanistan to establish a clear distinction between the funding and programs underway in the countries, which, it said, face different problems. It also called on Washington to appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan.
Violence has risen 27 percent in Afghanistan in the past year, with a 39 percent increase in attacks in the nation's eastern portion -- where most U.S. troops operate -- and a 60 percent surge in the province of Helmand, where the Taliban resurgence has been strongest.
Suicide bombings rose to 140 in 2007, compared with five between 2001 and 2005, according to official figures. U.S. and other foreign troop losses -- as well as Afghan civilian casualties -- reached the highest level since the U.S.-led invasion overthrew the Taliban government in 2001.
Amid the rising violence, the Pentagon announced this month that it would deploy 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan to help counter the expected Taliban offensive.
NATO's Not Winning in Afghanistan, Report Says
By Ann Scott TysonWashington Post Staff Writer Thursday, January 31, 2008; Page A18
NATO forces in Afghanistan are in a "strategic stalemate," as Taliban insurgents expand their control of sparsely populated areas and as the central government fails to carry out vital reforms and reconstruction, according to an independent assessment released yesterday by NATO's former commander.
"Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan," said the report by the Atlantic Council of the United States, chaired by retired Gen. James L. Jones, who until the summer of 2006 served as the supreme allied commander of NATO.
"Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become a failed state," warned the report, which called for "urgent action" to overhaul NATO strategy in coming weeks before an anticipated new offensive by Taliban insurgents in the spring.
The Atlantic Council report was one of two strongly worded assessments of the war in Afghanistan -- both led by Jones -- released at a Capitol Hill news conference yesterday. The second was by the Afghanistan Study Group, co-chaired by Jones and Thomas R. Pickering, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and other nations.
Jones said several steps are needed to "regain the momentum that appears to have been lost" in Afghanistan: a comprehensive campaign plan that integrates security and reconstruction work; the appointment of a United Nations High Commissioner to coordinate international efforts; and a new regional approach to stabilizing Afghanistan that would include conferences with neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran.
Progress in Afghanistan "is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country," said the report by the Afghanistan Study Group, created by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, which was also involved with the Iraq Study Group.
"The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid," the report said. It highlighted the lack of a clear strategy needed to "fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans."
The study group said the United States should "decouple" Iraq and Afghanistan to establish a clear distinction between the funding and programs underway in the countries, which, it said, face different problems. It also called on Washington to appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan.
Violence has risen 27 percent in Afghanistan in the past year, with a 39 percent increase in attacks in the nation's eastern portion -- where most U.S. troops operate -- and a 60 percent surge in the province of Helmand, where the Taliban resurgence has been strongest.
Suicide bombings rose to 140 in 2007, compared with five between 2001 and 2005, according to official figures. U.S. and other foreign troop losses -- as well as Afghan civilian casualties -- reached the highest level since the U.S.-led invasion overthrew the Taliban government in 2001.
Amid the rising violence, the Pentagon announced this month that it would deploy 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan to help counter the expected Taliban offensive.
Sunday, January 27, 2008
Karzai blames UK for return of Taliban
This is from the CBC. It seems that Karzai is quite angry at the UK for talking to the Taliban without consulting the central govt. apparently. Karzai also supported a local warlord and the UK and the US both suggested he get rid of him plus his security detail. I expect the result was that the warlord joined forces with the insurgency and indeed the security situation probably did get worse.
Criticisms such as this will not help create domestic support for the Afghan mission in the UK. If only Karzai would criticise the Canadian mission now it would probably do a great deal more good to create more public support to bring the troops home.
The US has criticised NATO partners for not being well trained in counter-insurgency---in contrast no doubt to the sterling performance of US troops!-
but there was an immediate footnote that of course Canadians were not meant to be included. Maybe it was the Monaco contingent!
Karzai blames Britain for return of Taliban
Last Updated: Friday, January 25, 2008 9:39 AM ET
CBC News
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accused British troops of making the security situation worse in parts of southern Afghanistan, saying the area "suffered" after their arrival.
Speaking to a group of journalists at the Davos Economic Forum on Thursday, Karzai said he shouldn't have listened to British and U.S. officials who said he should remove the local security forces that were already in place in Helmand province, The Times reported.
Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai speaks during a working session at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Thursday. (Michel Euler/AP Photo)
Britain has about 7,700 military personnel in the area, most of them fighting a resurgent Taliban in the country's south.
"There was one part of the country where we suffered after the arrival of the British forces," Karzai said. "Before that we were fully in charge of Helmand. When our governor was there, we were fully in charge.
"They came and said, 'Your governor is no good'. I said 'All right, do we have a replacement for this governor; do you have enough forces?'. Both the American and the British forces guaranteed to me they knew what they were doing and I made the mistake of listening to them.
"And when they came in, the Taliban came."
When asked if he blamed Britain for the return of the Taliban, Karzai said: "I just described the situation of mistakes we made. The mistake was that we removed a local arrangement without having a replacement.
"We removed the police force. That was not good. The security forces were not in sufficient numbers or information about the province. That is why the Taliban came in. It took us a year and a half to take back Musa Qala. This was not failure but a mistake," Karzai said.
But Britain's Foreign Office rejected the claim, saying its policy was to work in consultation with Karzai's government
"Our strategy in Helmand has been to work with the Afghan government to extend their authority throughout the province, creating a secure environment which allows political and economic development," a spokesman said on condition of anonymity in line with ministry practice.
"Our armed forces have suffered losses and shown great determination and bravery to achieve that objective," the spokesman said.
Last week, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates sparked criticism after he suggested in a newspaper interview that NATO forces in southern Afghanistan do not know how to properly combat a guerrilla insurgency, and that could be contributing to rising violence in the country.
Criticisms such as this will not help create domestic support for the Afghan mission in the UK. If only Karzai would criticise the Canadian mission now it would probably do a great deal more good to create more public support to bring the troops home.
The US has criticised NATO partners for not being well trained in counter-insurgency---in contrast no doubt to the sterling performance of US troops!-
but there was an immediate footnote that of course Canadians were not meant to be included. Maybe it was the Monaco contingent!
Karzai blames Britain for return of Taliban
Last Updated: Friday, January 25, 2008 9:39 AM ET
CBC News
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accused British troops of making the security situation worse in parts of southern Afghanistan, saying the area "suffered" after their arrival.
Speaking to a group of journalists at the Davos Economic Forum on Thursday, Karzai said he shouldn't have listened to British and U.S. officials who said he should remove the local security forces that were already in place in Helmand province, The Times reported.
Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai speaks during a working session at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Thursday. (Michel Euler/AP Photo)
Britain has about 7,700 military personnel in the area, most of them fighting a resurgent Taliban in the country's south.
"There was one part of the country where we suffered after the arrival of the British forces," Karzai said. "Before that we were fully in charge of Helmand. When our governor was there, we were fully in charge.
"They came and said, 'Your governor is no good'. I said 'All right, do we have a replacement for this governor; do you have enough forces?'. Both the American and the British forces guaranteed to me they knew what they were doing and I made the mistake of listening to them.
"And when they came in, the Taliban came."
When asked if he blamed Britain for the return of the Taliban, Karzai said: "I just described the situation of mistakes we made. The mistake was that we removed a local arrangement without having a replacement.
"We removed the police force. That was not good. The security forces were not in sufficient numbers or information about the province. That is why the Taliban came in. It took us a year and a half to take back Musa Qala. This was not failure but a mistake," Karzai said.
But Britain's Foreign Office rejected the claim, saying its policy was to work in consultation with Karzai's government
"Our strategy in Helmand has been to work with the Afghan government to extend their authority throughout the province, creating a secure environment which allows political and economic development," a spokesman said on condition of anonymity in line with ministry practice.
"Our armed forces have suffered losses and shown great determination and bravery to achieve that objective," the spokesman said.
Last week, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates sparked criticism after he suggested in a newspaper interview that NATO forces in southern Afghanistan do not know how to properly combat a guerrilla insurgency, and that could be contributing to rising violence in the country.
Friday, November 23, 2007
Taliban leaders open to talks
I just wonder whether these are splinter groups or the main leaders of the insurgency. I doubt that the main group will negotiate unless there is some agreement that the foreign troops withdraw but who knows what sort of deal Karzai and they might be cooking up. What is so laughable about all this is that the Canadian and other western governments always cry out against negotiating with terrorists while Karzai is willing to take them into his government. Anyway it is probably a step up from some of the warlords that are already part of his government.
The Karzai government is already influenced considerably by Islamists even to the point of resurrecting a ministry of vice and virtue.
Taliban leaders open to talks
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
This is from the canoe site.
KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Thursday that his government has had increasing contact with Taliban insurgents this year, including several talks this week with militant leaders living in exile.
Karzai said militants in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan have increasingly approached the government in the last eight months, even as the country goes through its most violent phase since the ouster of the Taliban after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.
"Only this week I've had more than five or six major contacts, approaches, by the leadership of the Taliban trying to find out if they can come back to Afghanistan," Karzai told reporters in Kabul after meeting NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.
Karzai did not specify which leaders he had spoken to or where the discussions took place.
"We are willing to talk. Those of the Taliban who are not part of al-Qaida or the terrorist networks, who do not want to be violent against the Afghan people ... those elements are welcome," he said.
In the past Karzai has offered to hold talks with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and to give militants a position in government in exchange for peace. Omar rejected those offers.
Afghan and Western officials believe many Taliban and al-Qaida leaders are living and organizing militant activities from across the border in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan. Pakistan denies the allegation and says its doing its best to quell the insurgency.
More than 6,000 people have been killed in insurgency-related violence in 2007, according to an Associated Press count based on figures from Western and Afghan officials.
The Karzai government is already influenced considerably by Islamists even to the point of resurrecting a ministry of vice and virtue.
Taliban leaders open to talks
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
This is from the canoe site.
KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Thursday that his government has had increasing contact with Taliban insurgents this year, including several talks this week with militant leaders living in exile.
Karzai said militants in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan have increasingly approached the government in the last eight months, even as the country goes through its most violent phase since the ouster of the Taliban after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.
"Only this week I've had more than five or six major contacts, approaches, by the leadership of the Taliban trying to find out if they can come back to Afghanistan," Karzai told reporters in Kabul after meeting NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.
Karzai did not specify which leaders he had spoken to or where the discussions took place.
"We are willing to talk. Those of the Taliban who are not part of al-Qaida or the terrorist networks, who do not want to be violent against the Afghan people ... those elements are welcome," he said.
In the past Karzai has offered to hold talks with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and to give militants a position in government in exchange for peace. Omar rejected those offers.
Afghan and Western officials believe many Taliban and al-Qaida leaders are living and organizing militant activities from across the border in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan. Pakistan denies the allegation and says its doing its best to quell the insurgency.
More than 6,000 people have been killed in insurgency-related violence in 2007, according to an Associated Press count based on figures from Western and Afghan officials.
Sunday, September 30, 2007
Taliban reject Karzai's offer of talks
This is hardly news or unexpected. The Taliban will not negotiate with Karzai until the foreign occupation of Afghanistan is ended. Karzai would not end that even if he could because he would not be in power and likely would not stay in power without foreign support. On the TV clips his US private guards are clearly visible in their dark glasses. Dynocorp has the contract.
The offer was a propaganda ploy but perhaps there is a hope that some Taliban will break off and join the government. It is interesting that Karzai has none of the standard blather about not negotiating with terrorists.
Taliban spokesman rejects Karzai's offer of talks
Last Updated: Sunday, September 30, 2007 | 8:42 AM ET
CBC News
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's offer of peace talks has been rejected by a Taliban spokesman, who on Sunday repeated a position he anounced earlier this month, saying there would be no negotiations until foreign troops withdraw from Afghanistan.
Karzai told reporters on Saturday that he wants to meet with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and is willing to give the insurgent group positions in government. But Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi turned down the proposal.
"The Taliban will never negotiate with the Afghan government in the presence of foreign forces," Ahmadi told the Associated Press. "Even if Karzai gives up his presidency, it's not possible that Mullah Omar would agree to negotiations."
Karzai's offer came shortly after a suicide bomber disguised as an Afghan soldier killed 30 people in Kabul. The victims included 28 soldiers who were on a bus taking them to work. Two civilians near the bus explosion were also killed.
Karzai's office, meantime, said Sunday that there is talk among some Taliban fighters about laying down arms.
"They want to live in peace and have a comfortable life with their families," Karzai spokesman Humayun Hamidzada said. "There is serious debate within their ranks, but this is a process that takes time."
About 50,000 foreign soldiers under NATO and U.S. command are stationed in Afghanistan. The international forces are preparing to hand security responsibilities to the Afghans and are hoping the transfer will take place by 2011.
In the last session of Parliament, Canada's defence minister, Gordon O'Connor, said the military is committed to keeping soldiers in Afghanistan until the end of February 2009.
Earlier this month, the new defence minister, Peter MacKay, said Canada has made it clear to its NATO allies that they cannot count on Canadian troops, totalling more than 2,000 in southern Afghanistan, to continue the combat mission after that. MacKay said he'll have a final decision before a NATO meeting in Romania next April.
The offer was a propaganda ploy but perhaps there is a hope that some Taliban will break off and join the government. It is interesting that Karzai has none of the standard blather about not negotiating with terrorists.
Taliban spokesman rejects Karzai's offer of talks
Last Updated: Sunday, September 30, 2007 | 8:42 AM ET
CBC News
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's offer of peace talks has been rejected by a Taliban spokesman, who on Sunday repeated a position he anounced earlier this month, saying there would be no negotiations until foreign troops withdraw from Afghanistan.
Karzai told reporters on Saturday that he wants to meet with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and is willing to give the insurgent group positions in government. But Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi turned down the proposal.
"The Taliban will never negotiate with the Afghan government in the presence of foreign forces," Ahmadi told the Associated Press. "Even if Karzai gives up his presidency, it's not possible that Mullah Omar would agree to negotiations."
Karzai's offer came shortly after a suicide bomber disguised as an Afghan soldier killed 30 people in Kabul. The victims included 28 soldiers who were on a bus taking them to work. Two civilians near the bus explosion were also killed.
Karzai's office, meantime, said Sunday that there is talk among some Taliban fighters about laying down arms.
"They want to live in peace and have a comfortable life with their families," Karzai spokesman Humayun Hamidzada said. "There is serious debate within their ranks, but this is a process that takes time."
About 50,000 foreign soldiers under NATO and U.S. command are stationed in Afghanistan. The international forces are preparing to hand security responsibilities to the Afghans and are hoping the transfer will take place by 2011.
In the last session of Parliament, Canada's defence minister, Gordon O'Connor, said the military is committed to keeping soldiers in Afghanistan until the end of February 2009.
Earlier this month, the new defence minister, Peter MacKay, said Canada has made it clear to its NATO allies that they cannot count on Canadian troops, totalling more than 2,000 in southern Afghanistan, to continue the combat mission after that. MacKay said he'll have a final decision before a NATO meeting in Romania next April.
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